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There are at least two competing hypotheses of how attention interacts with creative cog-
nition, although they are not mutually exclusive. The first hypothesis is that highly creative
people are particularly flexible at switching their attention – that is, they adaptively shift
focus among different attentional levels using cognitive control. The second, less com-
mon, view is that creative people exhibit attentional persistence, or an ability for sustained
attention. We suggest these two views need not be competing, as they may both oper-
ate, but on different time scales or on different components of creativity. In the present
study we examined the role of attention in real-world creative achievement and in divergent
thinking. In Experiment 1 participants with high and low real-world creative achievements
identified whether the stimulus contained letters S or H within hierarchically constructed
letters (e.g., large S made of small Es – global level; large E made up of small Ss – local level),
which were presented in blocks of eight trials per level. In Experiment 2 participants with
high, medium, and low creative achievements identified the same stimulus letters, but in
blocks of five, seven, and nine trials per level. Results from both experiments indicated that
people with high creative achievements made significantly more errors on trials in which
they had to switch the level of attention, even after controlling for general intelligence. In
Experiment 2, divergent thinking was also assessed, but it was not related to switching
cost. Results from both experiments demonstrate that real-world creative acts relate to
increased levels of attentional persistence, even if it comes with the cost of perseveration
in certain circumstances.
Keywords: creative achievement, divergent thinking, attentional flexibility, cognitive flexibility, persistence,
creativity, perseveration
INTRODUCTION
Creativity is thought to capitalize on a distinct form of attention,
yet how attention differs in creative people remains unresolved.
There are at least two seemingly contradictory hypotheses about
how attention relates to creative cognition. The first is a common
view that creative people have the attentional flexibility to adap-
tively shift focus between the two types of attentional foci using
cognitive control (e.g., Stavridou and Furnham, 1996; Vartanian,
2009). A second view is that creative people have the attentional
persistence to focus for extended durations, which is fundamen-
tal to creative production (Groborz and Neçka, 2003). These two
hypotheses need not be competing. Rather, they may both oper-
ate, but on different components of creativity, with two different
factors of attention at work. Specifically, cognitive flexibility may
be more descriptive of divergent thinking – the ability to generate
many diverse ideas, while attentional persistence may be required
for real-world creative achievements.
DIVERGENT THINKING AND ATTENTIONAL FLEXIBILITY
One component of creativity is divergent thinking, which is mea-
sured by tasks such as the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking
(TTCT; Torrance, 1974). According to the attentional flexibility
hypothesis, creative acts require the ability for rapid and fluid
switching between different types of foci – switching between
various ideas/stimuli, as well as the ability to see the large pic-
ture and to pay attention to its details, and to flexibly switch
between these two types of attention (Martindale, 1995; Gabora,
2010). Spontaneous shifts between analytic and associative modes
of thought, for example, are suggested to be necessary for creative
production (Gabora, 2010). Creative people are suggested to adjust
their focus of attention depending on the task demands. Specifi-
cally, people with higher (compared to those with lower) creative
potential, measured mostly by divergent thinking tests, are faster
on tasks not involving interference or ambiguity, but are slower on
tasks involving interference or ambiguity (Vartanian et al., 2007).
These results suggest that people with high creative potential may
in fact be more flexible along the attention continuum, speeding
up when they can and slowing down when they must.
Attentional flexibility requires people to switch quickly between
foci, i.e., between similar stimuli; or switch between levels of atten-
tion (broad or global versus narrow or local), or between degree of
filtering (high filtering with suppression of stimuli outside atten-
tion versus low filtering). It is also unclear what timescale of
flexibility is required for successful real-world creative production.
Rapid flexible attentional switching may be important for creativ-
ity in the short-term, such as for performance on timed tasks
of insight problem-solving (e.g., Bowden and Beeman, 1998) or
divergent thinking (e.g., Torrance, 1974). In the divergent thinking
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tasks used to measure creative potential, for example, people are
given 3 min to name as many uses for a familiar object, such as
a brick, as possible. Responses are scored for fluency (number of
solutions), originality (novelty of solutions), and flexibility (the
number of solution categories). In such tasks, rapid attentional
switching is rewarded, particularly for the fluency and flexibility
scores. Thus, it is likely that attentional flexibility will be related
to these measures of divergent thinking, which is a component of
creativity generally.
CREATIVE ACHIEVEMENT AND ATTENTIONAL PERSISTENCE
There is less evidence for the view that creative people have persis-
tent attention,particularly in the short-term – in part because there
are fewer studies of attentional persistence, and in part because
“creative people” is often defined as high divergent thinking scores.
The Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ) employed in
this study (Carson et al., 2005) provides a self-report measure
of how people have used creativity in the real-world (for details,
see Methods).
Many or most real-world creative acts require some degree of
persistence. Indeed, in order to create new ideas, new machines,
or highly original paintings, people have to invest an inordinate
amount of focus and persistence in the task at hand (Simonton,
1999). Since the time of Wallas (1926), immersion, i.e., extended
preparation and thought, has been considered a critical stage of
the creative process. In order to have a new idea, persistence
on the topic is needed to learn what is already known in the
field and what problems or issues could be addressed with new
ideas. Others note that even when ideas come in a flash, per-
sistence is required to put them to good use (Gabora, 2010).
Deep thinking, for example, has been found to increase task
shielding, and reduce shifting flexibility (Fischer and Hommel,
2012). According to the dual pathway to creativity model, cre-
ative originality can be reached through cognitive flexibility, as
well as through exploring fewer categories in greater depth, i.e.,
through persistence (Nijstad et al., 2010). Persistence in the dis-
covery process does not come easily. There are many conflicting
demands, and creative ideas are often, by definition, incom-
pletely formulated, or of dubious utility. What is the mechanism
that allows creative achievers to persevere in the face of these
difficulties?
Creative achievers may intrinsically be more likely to become
engaged in tasks through sheer love of their pursuit, or through
motivation. In addition, creative achievers may differ from less
creative people in how thoughts initially capture their attention,
and this may differ from attentional flexibility. Whatever the
mechanism, eminent creative people are suggested to be virtu-
ally addicted to their work (Eysenck, 1995). Newton purportedly
explained that he discovered the laws of gravity simply “by think-
ing on it continually” (Westfall, 1980). A considerable body of
research does in fact suggest that creativity involves the ability to
maintain an extended focus (Richards et al., 1988; Feist, 1999).
Artists, for instance, spend more time re-working a drawing than
do non-artists (Kozbelt, 2008). Thus, although some aspects of
creativity can require some form of cognitive flexibility, the abil-
ity for persistence may be a defining characteristic of successful
creative achievement.
How is persistence in the real-world related to persistence in a
simple task of attention switching? It is possible that real-world
creative achievement reflects personal characteristics, such as
motivation, grit, or persistence. But it may also reflect more basic
cognitive processes, such as participants’ attention or cognitive
control that favors persistent attention at a level of focus. This
study examines whether the capture or control of attention in the
short-term relates to long-term creative achievement. To control
for general intelligence, we took into account participants’ SAT
and ACT scores.
PRESENT STUDY AND HYPOTHESES
We conducted two experiments to examine how real-world cre-
ative achievers and divergent thinkers allot their attention, and
how they switch their attention over time. In both experiments,
participants identified target stimuli that could occur as either
local features or as global configurations of features. Critically,
unlike prior studies using randomly ordered stimuli (e.g., Vartan-
ian et al., 2007), the stimuli in our experiments were presented
in sets that repeated the level at which the target appeared – sets
of eight global, followed by eight local, etc., in Experiment 1, and
sets of five, seven, or nine repetitions of each level in Experiment 2.
Although participants were not informed of this pattern, it implic-
itly encouraged them to maintain attention on one attentional level
for some time before switching to the other level. Examining accu-
racy (and speed) of responses on trials in which the target level
switched allowed us to examine individual differences in the ability
to switch attention from one level to the other, as well as possible
preferences for either the local or global level. We compared par-
ticipants on the basis of real-world creative achievement, such as
producing artwork or publishing a scientific article (Carson et al.,
2005), and, separately, on a divergent thinking measure (Exper-
iment 2; Goff and Torrance, 2002). The primary question was:
once people establish an attentional set, are people with high cre-
ative achievements, or people with high divergent thinking scores,
more or less able to switch attention to the other level? Specifically,
if creative achievement is associated with attentional persistence,
then in both Experiments high creative achievers should show cost
when switching levels of attention, as evidenced by more errors or
slower response times at the switch trials compared to all other tri-
als within the task. Alternatively, if divergent thinking is associated
with attentional flexibility, then in Experiment 2 high divergent
thinkers should exhibit less cost when switching levels of attention.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-five undergraduate students (23 female, average age= 18.7
years) participated for course credit, after being selected from 261
students taking introduction to psychology class, who completed
the CAQ (Carson et al., 2005; see below). Nineteen students with
very low creative achievements (CAQ scores ranging 0–3) and 19
students with very high creative achievements (CAQ scores rang-
ing 25–54) were initially selected. This was done in order to insure
a full range of scores, given that random selection may not have
yielded participants with very high creative achievements. Three
participants from the low CAQ group did not show up for the
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experiment. Data from one person in the low creativity group
was dropped from the analysis because his response times on the
global-local attention task (Navon, 1977) were 3 SDs above the
mean. Thus, data from 34 participants were included in further
analyses: 19 with high and 15 with low creative achievement scores.
Written consent was obtained from all participants, and the pro-
tocol was approved by the Northwestern University Institutional
Review Board. Participants were tested individually in one 30-min
session.
Materials and procedure
The creative achievement questionnaire. Creative behavior was
assessed in terms of the Creative Achievement Questionnaire
(CAQ: Carson et al., 2005) participants indicated their prior cre-
ative achievements in 10 creative domains (architectural design,
creative writing, culinary arts, dance, humor, inventions, music,
scientific discovery, theater and film, and visual arts). Questions
in the Music domain, for example, range from “I have no training
or recognized talent in this area (score of 0)” to “My composi-
tions have been critiqued in a national publication (score of 7).”
In the Scientific Discovery domain scores range from “I have no
training or recognized ability in this field (score of 0)” to “My
work has been cited by other scientists in national publications
(score of 7).” Domain scores were then summed to form a single
index of creative achievement. The CAQ has test-retest reliability
of r = 0.81, internal consistency reliability of alpha= 0.96. It shows
predictive validity against artist ratings of a creative product – a
collage (r = 0.59, p< 0.01), and correlates with tests of creative
potential, such as divergent thinking tests (r = 0.47, p< 0.01),
the Creative Personality Scale (Gough, 1979; r = 0.33, p< 0.01),
Intellect (Goldberg, 1992; r = 0.51, p< 0.01), and Openness to
Experience (Costa and McCrae, 1992; r = 0.33, p< 0.01). In addi-
tion, CAQ shows discriminant validity with tests of IQ (Carson
et al., 2005). Even though CAQ is a self-report measure, it has
ecological validity in that it reflects actual creative behavior in the
real-world.
Global-local task. The abilities to attend to local stimuli or global
configurations, and to switch between them, were examined with a
series of global letters (38 mm× 25 mm) composed of local letters
(6 mm× 4 mm) (Navon, 1977). Stimuli were presented one at a
time. On each trial, participants looked for a target letter – either
an“S”or an“H”– that could occur at either the local or global level.
Each vertical line making up a global letter was formed from five,
and each horizontal line was formed from four, closely spaced local
letters. It has been suggested that global processing takes prece-
dence over local processing (e.g., Navon, 1981; Treisman, 1986);
however, several studies have found that the global versus local
advantage depends on the characteristics of the stimuli and task
demands (e.g., Grice et al., 1983). The stimuli employed here were
designed to be unbiased toward either level (see Bultitude et al.,
2009; cf. Vartanian et al., 2007).
Participants viewed stimuli from a distance of approximately
60 cm from the computer display. On each trial, participants were
first presented with a fixation cross (“+”) in the center of the
screen for 1000 ms. Then, one of eight composite stimuli was
randomly presented, and participants pressed an “S” key if the
stimulus contained the letter S or an “H” key if the stimulus con-
tained the letter H. They were asked to respond as quickly and
accurately as possible. Four of the composite letters were global
target letters composed of local distractors (an S made of Es, an S
made of As, an H made of Es, an H made of As), and four were
global distractors made from local target letters (an E made of Ss,
an E made of H s, an A made of Ss, an A made of H s).
The key feature of the task was that the letters were presented
in alternating blocks of eight local trials, followed by eight global
trials, and so on, with the first block type (local or global) counter-
balanced across participants. Such blocking of levels allowed for
testing participants’ performance on the switch trial, i.e., the first
trial in which the target occurred at a given level (local or global)
versus the non-switch trials, i.e., all other trials in the task – the
primary interest of the study. Overall, 64 local and 64 global trials
were presented, in addition to 16 (unanalyzed) practice trials.
General intelligence. Participants provided their SAT and ACT
scores, which were converted into percentile scores based on
the national statistics for all test-takers in 2011 (M = 94.11,
SD= 11.58).
RESULTS
Participants made an average of 2.73% errors (SD= 2.80).
Because participants were selected for high versus low cre-
ative achievement, we performed group comparisons. Over-
all, people with high creative achievements made more errors
(M = 3.58%, SD= 2.99) than those with low creative achieve-
ments (M = 1.67%, SD= 2.19), t (32)=−2.08, p< 0.05.
Switching and creative achievement
Our primary interest concerned whether people with high cre-
ative achievements make more or fewer errors when switching
from one level of attention to the other. In other words, we were
interested in whether creative achievement is related to switch-
ing costs. (Raw data for within block versus switching trials are
in Table 1). Switching cost was calculated as the difference score,
i.e., how many more errors participants made on switching trials
compared to all other trials, i.e., switch trials minus all other trials.
Switching cost was significantly higher for high creative achiev-
ers (M = 5.65%, SD= 9.41) compared to low creative achievers
(M = 0.45%, SD= 2.88), t (32)= 2.06, p< 0.05. Thus, high cre-
ative achievers had initial difficulty switching from one atten-
tional level to the other. However, this difficulty dissipated quickly
(there was no difference by trial 2: high creative achievement
group M = 2.96%, SD= 5.66; low creative achievement group
M = 2.92%, SD= 6.63, t < 0.1).
Table 1 | Experiment 1: mean (and SD) percent error rates on switch
trials versus all other trials for high and low creative achievers.
Creative achievement
High Low
Switch trials (% errors) 8.53 (10.57) 2.07 (3.90)
Other trials (% errors) 2.88 (2.30) 1.61 (2.08)
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A binary logistic regression indicated that high creative achiev-
ers had higher switching cost compared to low creative achiev-
ers even when controlling for general intelligence, b= 0.21, SE
b= 0.11, p< 0.05.
Global versus local targets
Participants erred about equally often on global (M = 3.08%,
SD= 3.52) and local trials (M = 2.39%, SD= 3.32), t (33)= 1.02,
p= 0.31. Stimulus level (local versus global targets) did not reliably
interact with creative achievement level, F(1, 32)= 0.21, p= 0.65.
Furthermore, all participants made errors equally often when
switching from global to local targets or vice versa, and this did
not interact with creative achievement (all Fs< 1.0).
Response time
We performed parallel analyses with response times as the depen-
dent variable, excluding errors, and response times exceeding 3
SDs from the mean. There was no speed-accuracy tradeoff: high
and low creative achievers showed equivalent switching costs
in response time, even while high creative achievers showed a
greater switching cost in accuracy. Overall, participants averaged
633 ms to respond to trials (SD= 94 ms). Participants responded
equally quickly on global (M = 639 ms, SD= 99 ms) and local tri-
als (M = 625 ms, SD= 100 ms), t (33)= 1.31, p= 0.20, which was
expected given that our stimuli were designed not to have global
precedence. Creative achievement groups did not differ on over-
all response time, and the type of trial (global versus local) did
not interact with creative achievement level (low versus high), all
Fs< 1.0.
Predictably,participants responded more slowly on switch trials
(M = 746 ms, SD= 156 ms) than on all other trials (M = 610 ms,
SD= 95 ms), F(1, 32)= 55.75 p< 0.001. This again indicates that
participants exhibited response time cost when switching from
one attentional level to the other. However, this switching cost
was roughly equal for high (141 ms) and low (134 ms) creative
achievers, and switching did not interact with creative achieve-
ment (F < 1.0). Creative achievement groups did not differ in
their response time cost in switching from global to local trials
or vice versa (t s< 1.0).
DISCUSSION AND EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 1, even when controlling for general intelligence,
high creative achievers made more errors when switching levels of
attention than did low creative achievers, while there were no dif-
ferences in response times and no differences based on the type of
stimulus (global versus local). Notably, high creative achievers per-
formed worse overall on the task than did low creative achievers,
in contrast to the intuition that people with high creative achieve-
ments would excel on most tasks. In particular, after a series of
trials in which the targets appeared at the same attention level
(either all global or all local), the high creative achievers had more
difficulty switching to the other level than did participants with
low creative achievement. This demonstrates a novel link between
attentional persistence and creative achievement, a distinct effect
from previous reports that creativity (at least, divergent thinking)
is related to attentional flexibility (e.g., Vartanian et al., 2007).
Although on the surface these results might seem to differ from
previous findings, we suggest this is a distinct effect of attentional
switching that results from a different mechanism of attention,
and is not necessarily in opposition with prior claims.
It is possible, though not plausible, that high creative achiev-
ers were better at noticing the pattern of the blocked levels (so
attended more to the block level and were thus more affected by
the switch), whereas low creative achievers ignored the pattern.
However, this explanation is unlikely, as both groups made more
errors when switching target levels; moreover, high creative achiev-
ers actually made slightly more errors than low creative achievers
even on non-switch trials, so they failed to show greater benefit
within a run of trials at a level. Alternatively, perhaps low creative
achievers not only noticed the sequences, but knew exactly when
to switch their attention, and so showed less cost when switch-
ing between levels. However, the low creative achievers did show a
cost (in both accuracy and response time) when switching levels of
attention. Further, in debriefing, no participants reported noticing
the target levels were blocked. It is also possible that high creative
achievers were simply bored or distracted, and therefore were off
task, however, error rates within the block were still very low, and,
most importantly, there was a significant interaction between the
switch trials and all other trials within the block. Given the nature
of the task, it does not seem that being off task would predict
errors specifically at the switch point. It is also important to note
that participants who performed worse on the task were high cre-
ative achievers, and should be expected to be persistent on any task.
A final concern is that the error rates for most trials, other than the
switch trial, were so low that a floor effect may have masked group
differences that occurred in trials 2–8, the non-switch trials.
To address these issues,we made several changes for Experiment
2: we decreased the predictability of the switch trials by varying
the sequence length; and to eliminate potential floor effects, we
increased error rates by varying a (perceived) response deadline
such that all participants made between 5 and 30% errors. Thus
we manipulated each participant’s overall error rate, and directly
examined the switch cost, i.e., how many more errors participants
made when the target level switched, compared to errors on all
other trials.
Furthermore, besides again contrasting participants on creative
achievement, Experiment 2 also investigated whether attentional
persistence varies with divergent thinking, another measure of cre-
ativity. Previous investigations found their measure of creativity
(weighted toward divergent thinking) related to attentional flex-
ibility (Stavridou and Furnham, 1996; Vartanian, 2009). If our
attention task measures the same type of attentional flexibility,
high divergent thinkers in our sample should exhibit the reverse
effect of high creative achievers, i.e., high divergent thinkers should
exhibit less switching cost compared to low divergent thinkers. On
the other hand, if our attention task is tapping into a different
attention switching mechanism, we should see either no differ-
ence between high and low divergent thinkers, or a similar effect
to that observed with high and low creative achievers.
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-nine undergraduate students (24 female, average
age= 20.47 years) participated for course credit or payment. They
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were either pre-selected based on their CAQ scores (high, medium,
and low) from the Introduction to Psychology class, or recruited
to participate for payment. This was again done in order to ensure
a full range of creative achievement scores.
Materials and procedure
The creative achievement questionnaire. We assessed partici-
pant’s real-world creative achievements with the CAQ (Carson
et al., 2005). CAQ scores ranged between 0 and 95, with a mean
CAQ score of 13.85 (median= 10.00, SD= 16.09).
Abbreviated torrance test for adults. To examine divergent
thinking, we used the abbreviated torrance test for adults (ATTA:
Goff and Torrance, 2002), a shortened form of the TTCT (Tor-
rance, 1974), a standard measure of creative potential (Kim, 2008).
The ATTA consists of three activities (3 min each), one involving
verbal responses (e.g., identifying problems of being able to fly
without being in an airplane or a similar vehicle), and two involv-
ing figural responses (e.g., using incomplete figures to make pic-
tures). Responses are scored for fluency (i.e., a count of the number
of pertinent responses), originality (i.e., the number of responses
that are unique and original), flexibility (i.e., the number of cat-
egories used), and elaboration (i.e., the extent to which responses
are detailed or elaborated upon), with summary scores summed
across the three activities (Goff and Torrance, 2002). We com-
puted a single divergent thinking score based on the averaged z-
transformed fluency, originality, flexibility, and elaboration scores.
Local-global task. The attributes of the stimuli (Navon, 1977)
were the same as in Experiment 1. The task procedure was similar
to Experiment 1 except for three changes:
(1) Participants were instructed to respond accurately, but as
quickly as possible. To induce more errors, we adjusted each par-
ticipant’s (perceived) response window based on his/her response
times (after practice trials) and error rates (after Block 1) to
ensure participants made an average of 5–30% errors (com-
bined across switch and non-switch trials). Participants viewed
the stimulus on a white background for 200 ms, then viewed
a white blank screen for 500 ms, and were instructed to make
their responses (i.e., identify whether there was a letter “S” or
“H” present on the screen) during that time. Thus, the white
blank screen provided a visible response window. The screen
then turned gray for 400 ms indicating the end of the response
window. Even though participants were instructed to make their
responses during the white response window, we collected and
analyzed responses after the response window as well (making
available response times up to 1100 ms after onset of the stimu-
lus). Participants performed 45 practice trials, and two blocks of
experimental trials of 168 trials in each block.
After practice trials, the experimenter adjusted the response
window based on each participant’s response time, to induce
more errors. The response window was adjusted to 150 ms less
than the participant’s average response time on the practice trials.
Participants then performed Block 1, after which the experi-
menter adjusted the response window for Block 2 based on the
following criteria: if participants made fewer than 5% of errors on
Block 1, the response window was adjusted by subtracting 50 ms
from their average response time on Block 1. If participants made
between 5 and 20% errors, the response window remained the
same as on Block 1 trials. If participants made between 20 and
30% errors, 50 ms was added to the average response time. And
finally, if they made over 30% errors, the experimenter added
100 ms to the response window.
Although we varied the perceived response window to induce
similar error rates for each participant, the response window
durations (from stimulus onset until the onset of the gray screen)
did not differ across groups, F < 1 (durations of 629 ms for low,
585 ms for medium, and 601 ms for high creative achievers).
(2) In order to prevent participants from knowing when switch
trials would occur, blocks presented five, seven, or nine stimuli at
each level, with order of block size pseudo-randomized. Because
this was done in order to make the switch less predictable, and we
did not have any a priori predictions regarding this manipulation,
data were collapsed across the three block lengths.
(3) In case the fixation cross in Experiment 1 served as a local
prime, in Experiment 2 we used a fixation circle (1000 ms), sized
midway between the global and the local letter stimuli.
Participants used a chin rest while performing the task to ensure
the distance between the participant and the computer display was
the same for all participants (60 cm).
General intelligence. Participants provided their SAT and ACT
scores, which were converted into percentiles scores for the year
2011, and used as a measure of general intelligence (M = 95.26,
SD= 10.69).
RESULTS
Participants made an average of 13.56% errors (SD= 8.21); this
is higher than Experiment 1 error rates because we induced more
errors by limiting the (perceived) response window. The critical
point is when these errors were made – on the switch trials, or
on other trials within the block. Overall, participants erred more
often on the trial after the switch (M = 21.72%, SD= 8.89) com-
pared to all other trials (M = 12.26%, SD= 8.39), t (38)= 10.72,
p< 0.001.
Creative achievement
Because participants were initially selected within high (CAQ
scores 1–8, M = 3.86), medium (CAQ scores 9–12, M = 10.15),
and low (CAQ scores 13–95, M= 29.50) creative achieve-
ment groups, and because the CAQ score ranges differed
within the groups, we examined differences between the three
groups. Overall, error rates did not differ between high
(M = 13.56%, SD= 8.14), medium (M = 12.69%, SD= 8.10),
and low (M = 15.29%, SD= 8.98) creative achievers, F(2,
38)= 0.48, p= 0.62. This is not surprising because we manipu-
lated the response window to induce roughly equal overall error
rates for each participant.
Of more interest is whether creative achievement related to
switching costs. To parallel Experiment 1 analyses, and because
manipulation of the response window equated overall error rates,
we analyzed the switching costs, i.e., how many more errors par-
ticipants of varying creative achievement made on switch trials
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compared to all other trials (see Figure 1). A one-way ANCOVA,
controlling for general intelligence, showed the switching cost dif-
fered across the three creative achievement groups, F(2, 31)= 3.44,
p< 0.05. If the data are analyzed as a mixed ANCOVA, with
switch versus other trials as a factor, with general intelligence as a
covariate, the interaction between group and switching remains
reliable, F(2, 36)= 3.69, p= 0.04. Independent sample t -tests
indicated that high creative achievers showed a larger switch
cost (M = 11.92%, SD= 4.19) than did the low creative achiev-
ers (M = 6.86%, SD= 6.42), F(1, 24)= 5.59, p= 0.02, although
the medium creative achievers (M = 10.00%, SD= 5.15) did not
reliably differ from the other two groups, all Fs< 2.
Global versus local targets
Participants erred slightly more often on global (M = 15.60%,
SD= 9.35) than on local trials (M = 11.39%, SD= 9.80),
t (38)=−2.64, p= 0.01. All participants erred equally often when
switching from global to local targets or vice versa, and this did
not interact with creative achievement (all Fs< 1).
Response time results
Although errors were the primary dependent variable, we per-
formed parallel analyses with response times as the dependent
variable, excluding errors, and response times exceeding 3 SDs
from the mean. Average response times (M = 496 ms, SD= 73 ms)
were faster in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 precisely
because we required participants to respond faster by adjust-
ing the response window. Overall, participants showed a switch
cost in response time, responding more slowly on switch trials
(M = 509 ms, SD= 85.35) than on other trials (M = 490.23 ms,
SD= 65.60), t (38)= 3.77, p= 0.001.
As in Experiment 1, creative achievement groups did not dif-
fer on overall response time (high CAQ M = 481 ms, SD= 30.86;
medium CAQ M = 498.31, SD= 92.47, high CAQ M = 506.57,
SD= 81.64), F < 1; nor did creative achievement interact with
switch cost (F = 1.0). Thus, the greater effect for high creative
achievers in error rates was not offset by a smaller effect in
response time.
FIGURE 1 | Experiment 2: switching cost (percent errors) for high,
medium, and low creative achievers. Error bars represent standard error.
Participants responded more slowly on global (M = 513 ms,
SD= 69) than on local trials (M = 476 ms,SD= 70), t (38)=−9.44,
p< 0.001. However, the type of trial (global versus local) did not
interact with creative achievement level (high, medium, and low)
or switching, all Fs< 1.7.
Divergent thinking
Group comparisons examining differences between high,medium,
and low divergent thinkers (as measured by the ATTA) indicated
that error rates did not differ between the three groups (high:
M = 12.85%, SD= 5.41, medium: M = 13.00%, SD= 9.07, and
low divergent thinkers: M = 14.85%, SD= 9.77), F(2, 38)= 0.23,
p= 0.79. More importantly, the error rate switching cost did not
vary by divergent thinking group, even when controlling for gen-
eral intelligence (Fs< 1). The three divergent thinking groups did
not differ on overall response time, switching cost, or type of trial
(global versus local), all Fs< 1.5. Given that the divergent think-
ing scores were continuous, rather than falling strictly into three
groups, we also performed a simultaneous multiple regression.
Controlling for general intelligence, switching cost was not a strong
predictor of divergent thinking, t =−0.93, p= 0.36, b=−0.02,
SE b= 0.02.
DISCUSSION
Replicating the results of Experiment 1, when a target stimulus
required participants to switch level of attention (after a block of
stimuli at a consistent level), high creative achievers erred reli-
ably more often than low creative achievers, even after accounting
for general intelligence, indicating attentional perseveration to a
given level of attention. However, this was not true for divergent
thinking – high divergent thinkers did not reliably differ from
low divergent thinkers on the number of errors they made when
switching levels of attention compared to all other trials. In Experi-
ment 2, it cannot be argued that low creative achievers were at floor,
or that they were better at predicting when the switch would occur.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
Our results demonstrate a novel link between a simple form of
attention switching and creative achievement (CAQ), one mea-
sure of creativity. In contrast this switching effect did not relate
to divergent thinking, another common measure of creativity. The
purpose of the investigation was to examine attentional persistence
in creativity. Experiment 1 found that attentional persistence, to
the point of perseveration, was related to high creative achieve-
ment, even when accounting for general intelligence. Experiment
2 confirmed that attentional persistence is related to high creative
achievement,and clarified that it is unrelated to divergent thinking,
as measured by the ATTA.
Specifically, we examined whether people who differ in cre-
ative achievement and divergent thinking also differ in the ability
to switch attention from one level (local or global) to another.
Participants responded to blocks of trials in which the target stim-
uli occurred at one level, followed by a switch to a block at the
other level. We were particularly interested in performance at the
point when people had to switch between levels. In Experiment
1, participants with high creative achievements made more errors
than participants with low creative achievements when switching
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levels, with no change in response times. High creative achiev-
ers erred at the switch because they were attending to the wrong
level where the target did not occur, indicating that they have
difficulty switching the focus of attention. The trouble in switch-
ing levels of attention is likely due to attentional persistence.
This detriment, however, dissipated quickly: by the second trial
after the switch, high creative achievers responded just as accu-
rately as low creative achievers. Experiment 2 replicated the results
of Experiment 1, confirming that high creative achievers make
more errors when required to switch levels of attention, compared
to low creative achievers. Divergent thinking, however, did not
show this pattern – high and low divergent thinkers performed
equally well.
High creative achievers exhibited cost (more errors) at the
point of the switch of attention foci, but did not show bene-
fit (such as improved response time or better accuracy) on the
string of trials with targets occurring at a single level of atten-
tion. It is not likely that high creative achievers were simply
trying harder on the task and paying more attention to the pat-
tern, therefore noticing that the target level repeated for some
time, because they showed no benefit in the midst of blocks.
Therefore, compared to low creative achievers, high achievers inef-
ficiently persisted at each level (i.e., such that they made errors
when the level switched), without being more focused within
each block.
In contrast to high creative achievers, high divergent thinkers
did not show attentional persistence when switching levels of
attention, suggesting that it is possible to disentangle basic under-
lying cognitive processes, such as capture of attention, that may
differ across different components of creativity.
On the surface, the finding that high creative achievers per-
formed worse than low creative achievers when required to switch
attention seems at odds with some prior research concluding that
highly creative people have greater cognitive flexibility (Martin-
dale, 1995; Vartanian et al., 2007; Gabora, 2010). In the current
results, high creative achievers were less flexible when a change
in stimuli required they switch their level (global versus local) of
attention.
In one study also using a global-local letter task, cognitive
flexibility was inferred because highly creative people seemed to
take a different approach across tasks (Vartanian et al., 2007).
Specifically, high creativity scores correlated with faster respond-
ing on tasks that lacked interfering demands for attention, but
also with slower responses when interference occurred within
a task. For hierarchical letter stimuli, creativity correlated with
slower responding to the local stimuli, for which there was a
high degree of interference (from the dominant global trials),
but did not relate to speed of responding on the global tri-
als because the local stimuli did not interfere as much. Their
results on the global-local task in some ways parallel ours as
their more creative participants performed worse (i.e., slowed
down). Vartanian et al. (2007) attributed this decrement to the
effect of global precedence of their stimuli – since creative indi-
viduals have broader attention, they have difficulty ignoring the
strong global stimuli, and the random order didn’t provide any
cues. In our experiments, we used stimuli designed to be equally
strong at the local and global levels. However, the sequence of the
stimuli established a bias toward an attentional level, such that
when the sequence was broken, our more creative participants
also performed worse (i.e., making more errors) than less creative
participants.
Still, the Vartanian et al. (2007) study and the current differ
in several critical ways: the participant groups being contrasted,
and the type of attentional switch necessary. Vartanian et al.
(2007) contrasted groups on what they called creative potential,
defined by a combination of the fluency factor on a standard
divergent thinking task, an insight problem-solving task, and a
self-report scale of creative personality. In order to do well on
the first two measures, fast switching of attention is in itself
a requirement. Our study, on the other hand, assessed creativ-
ity in terms of real-world creative achievements, as well as (in
Experiment 2) divergent thinking. The second difference is that
the earlier investigation used randomly ordered stimuli with an
intrinsic bias toward the global level, whereas in our study the
global bias was not present, and people had a chance to develop
a preference for an attentional level through repetition. In addi-
tion, their creative participants slowed down (when encountering
task interference), whereas our creative participants made rela-
tively more errors (when stimuli required them to switch level of
attention).
We suggest that creative people may indeed have flexible atten-
tion, perhaps in part because their primary mode of attention
is defocused or global (Martindale, 1995). Simple attentional
breadth on both the perceptual and conceptual levels, for exam-
ple, has been suggested to foster access to remote associations and
thereby facilitate creativity (Förster and Dannenberg, 2010). Sim-
ilarly, decreased latent inhibition, or decreased ability to screen
from conscious awareness stimuli previously experienced as irrel-
evant, has been associated with increased creative achievement in
high-functioning people (Carson et al., 2003). Whereas this defo-
cused attention is beneficial for detecting alternative foci (external
stimuli or internal associations), it may also demand that highly
creative people exert more cognitive control in order to focus
even within the block, and it takes time or effort to disengage
this cognitive control (see Zabelina and Robinson, 2010). Sup-
porting this idea, high creative achievers showed a cost when
switching levels of attention when a sequence of trials at one level
ended, but did not show benefit (less errors or lower response
times) on the trials within the sequence. In fact, high creative
achievers made slightly more errors even within the blocks (in
Experiment 1; Experiment 2 equated performance levels, so no
difference could emerge within blocks). Therefore high creative
achievers showed an increased cost when switching after each
block because they had engaged cognitive control to maintain
focus within the block, and needed to disengage this control at
the switch. Thus, the attentional style of highly creative people
may be a double edged-sword: while initially defocused attention
may switch quickly, cognitive control may take longer to switch.
Nonetheless, both edges of this sword have potential benefits for
creativity.
Although prior studies suggested that flexible switching
between global and local modes of processing may promote suc-
cessful creative problem-solving (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006;
Wiley and Jarosz, 2012), it appears that real-world creative acts
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may be at least partially dependent on increased levels of cognitive
control and resulting attentional persistence. Perhaps this par-
tially explains why artists, compared to non-artists, spend more
time re-working their drawings (Kozbelt, 2008): they either have
learned that to achieve anything worthwhile, they need to spend
time perfecting it, or they are simply more intrinsically interested
in the task. The current experiments demonstrate that the ten-
dency for perseverance may indeed be a defining characteristic of
successful creative achievement, even if it comes with the cost of
perseveration in certain circumstances.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported by the NSF Graduate Research Fellow-
ship to Darya L. Zabelina, and John Templeton Foundation Grant
to Mark Beeman. We thank Aleksandra Sherman and Edward
Bowden for their assistance with the project.
REFERENCES
Bowden, E., and Beeman, M. (1998).
Getting the right idea: semantic acti-
vation in the right hemisphere may
help solve insight problems. Psychol.
Sci. 9, 435–440.
Bultitude, J. H., Rafal, R. D., and
List, A. (2009). Prism adaptation
reverses the local processing bias
in patients with right temporo-
parietal junction lesions. Brain 132,
1669–1677.
Carson, S. H., Peterson, J. B., and
Higgins, D. M. (2003). Decreased
latent inhibition is associated with
increased creative achievement in
high-functioning individuals. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 85, 499–506.
Carson, S. H., Peterson, J. B., and
Higgins, D. M. (2005). Reliability,
validity, and factor structure of the
creative achievement questionnaire.
Creat. Res. J. 17, 37–50.
Costa, P. T., and McCrae, R. R. (1992).
Revised NEO Personality Inventory
and NEO Five-Factor Inventory Pro-
fessional Manual. Odessa, FL: Psy-
chological Assessment Resources.
Eysenck, H. J. (1995). Genius: The
Natural History of Creativity. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Feist, G. J. (1999). “The influence of
personality on artistic and scien-
tific creativity,” in Handbook of Cre-
ativity, ed. R. J. Sternberg (New
York: Cambridge University Press),
273–296.
Fischer, R., and Hommel, B. (2012).
Deep thinking increases task-set
shielding and reduces shifting flexi-
bility in dual-task performance. Cog-
nition 123, 303–307.
Förster, J., and Dannenberg, L. (2010).
GLOMOsys: a systems account of
global versus local processing. Psy-
chol. Inq. 21, 175–197.
Gabora, L. (2010). Revenge of the
“Neurds”: characterizing creative
thought in terms of the structure and
dynamics of memory. Creat. Res. J.
22, 1–13.
Goff, K., and Torrance, E. P. (2002).
Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults
Manual. Bensenville, IL: Scholastic
Testing Service.
Goldberg, L. R. (1992). The develop-
ment of markers for the Big-Five
factor structure. Psychol. Assess. 4,
26–42.
Gough, H. G. (1979). A creative person-
ality for the Adjective Check List. J.
Pers. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1398–1405.
Grice, G. R., Canham, L., and Boroughs,
J. M. (1983). Forest before trees?
It depends where you look. Percept.
Psychophys. 33, 121–128.
Groborz, M., and Neçka, E. (2003).
Creativity and cognitive control:
explorations of generation and eval-
uation skills. Creat. Res. J. 15,
183–197.
Kim, K. H. (2008). Commentary: the
Torrance tests of creative thinking
already overcome many of the per-
ceived weaknesses that Silvia et al.’s
(2008) methods are intended to cor-
rect. Psychol. Aesthet. Creat. Arts 2,
97–99.
Kozbelt, A. (2008). Hierarchical liner
modeling of creative artists’ problem
solving behaviors. J. Creat. Behav. 42,
181–200.
Martindale, C. (1995). “Creativity and
connectionism,” in The Creative
Cognition Approach, eds S. M.
Smith, T. B. Ward, and R. A.
Finke (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
249–268.
Navon, D. (1977). Forest before trees:
the precedence of global features in
visual perception. Cogn. Psychol. 9,
353–383.
Navon, D. (1981). The forest revisited:
more on global precedence. Psychol.
Res. 43, 1–32.
Nijstad, B. A., De Dreu, C. K. W.,
Rietzschel, E. R., and Baas, M.
(2010). The dual pathway to cre-
ativity model: creative ideation as
a function of flexibility and per-
sistence. Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 21,
34–77.
Richards, R., Kinney, D. K., Binet, M.,
and Merzel, A. P. (1988). Assess-
ing everyday creativity: characteris-
tics of the lifetime creativity scales
and validation with three large
samples. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 54,
476–485.
Simonton, D. K. (1999). Origins of
Genius: Darwinian Perspectives on
Creativity. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Smallwood, J., and Schooler, J. W.
(2006). The restless mind. Psychol.
Bull. 132, 946–958.
Stavridou, A., and Furnham, A. (1996).
The relationship between psychoti-
cism, trait-creativity, and the atten-
tional mechanism of cognitive
inhibition. Pers. Individ. Dif. 21,
143–153.
Torrance, E. P. (1974). The Torrance Tests
of Creative Thinking-Norms – Tech-
nical Manual Research Edition, Fig-
ural Tests, Forms A and B. Princeton,
NJ: Personnel Press.
Treisman, A. (1986). “Properties, parts,
and objects,” in Handbook of Percep-
tion and Human Performance, Vol. 2,
eds K. R. Boff, L. Kaufman, and J. P.
Thomas (New York: Wiley), 1–70.
Vartanian, O. (2009). Variable atten-
tion facilitates creative problem solv-
ing. Psychol. Aesthet. Creat. Arts 3,
57–59.
Vartanian, O., Martindale, C., and
Kwiatkowski, J. (2007). Creative
potential, attention, and speed of
information processing. Pers. Indi-
vid. Dif. 43, 1470–1480.
Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought.
New York: Harcourt Brace.
Westfall, R. S. (1980). Newton’s mar-
velous years of discovery and their
aftermath: myth versus manuscript.
Isis 71, 109–121.
Wiley, J., and Jarosz, A. (2012). Working
memory capacity, attentional focus,
and problem solving. Psychol. Sci. 21,
258–262.
Zabelina, D. L., and Robinson, M. D.
(2010). Creativity as flexible cogni-
tive control. Psychol. Aesthet. Creat.
Arts 4, 136–143.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
flict of interest.
Received: 07 February 2013; accepted: 29
March 2013; published online: 25 April
2013.
Citation: Zabelina DL and Beeman M
(2013) Short-term attentional persever-
ation associated with real-life creative
achievement. Front. Psychol. 4:191. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00191
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Cognition, a specialty of Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Zabelina and Beeman.
This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Com-
mons Attribution License, which per-
mits use, distribution and reproduction
in other forums, provided the original
authors and source are credited and sub-
ject to any copyright notices concerning
any third-party graphics etc.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition April 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 191 | 8
